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Abstract
We set up an OLG-model, where households both choose human capital
investment and decide on investing their endogenous savings in a portfolio
of riskless and risky assets, exposing them to (aggregate) wage and capital
risks due to technological shocks. We derive the optimal public policy mix
of taxation and education policy. We show that risks can be efficiently diver-
sified between private and public consumption. This results hinges on that
the government can apply a wide set of instruments, including differentiated
wage and capital taxation. We also show that for sufficient risk aversion the
(Northern) European way of relying on progressive wage taxation and grant-
ing education subsidies is an optimal response to wage and capital risks.
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1 Introduction
In 1789, Benjamin Franklin stated in a letter to Jean-Baptist Leroy that “in this
world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.” Households
are in fact (and still) exposed to multiple risks in their lives – and among these,
apart from the risk of falling seriously ill, wage and capital income risks probably
are the most important risk factors for well-being: capital income is vulnerable
to world-wide shocks, as there has been, e.g., a slow-down in stock markets and
the real economy after the terror attack on 9/11 2001 as well as recently due to
the US-subprime disaster. Wage income exhibits also large fluctuations, caused,
among others, by globalization and skill-biased technological change.1
Another feature affecting well-being is education (or human capital). Whilst
the importance of education is emphasized by many branches in the economic
literature – very prominent is the one on human capital and growth (e.g., Bils
and Klenow, 2000), – it has ambiguous and interdependent effects on income
risk: studies and stylized facts show that human capital on the one hand acts
as insurance against unemployment (Chapman, 1993, OECD, 2007), while on
the other hand it amplifies other income risks (Mincer, 1974, Wildasin, 2000,
Carneiro, 2003).
Unfortunately, human capital and wage risks are personalized, being non-
tradable in markets. Consequently, households cannot diversify their exposure
to risk efficiently. Moreover, even the idiosyncratic part of wage risks can rarely
be insured against in private markets due to moral hazard, adverse selection and
legal limitations (Sinn, 1996). Thus, what can be done in order to make life safer?
Almost 200 years after Franklin, it turned out in economic literature that the
certainty of taxes can also have a welfare improving effect, because taxation and
its revenue can provide risk insurance by decreasing the variance in income and
consumption (i.e., Eaton and Rosen, 1980a,b). However, the previous literature –
to the best of our knowledge – restricts to only one aspect of risk per model and
to a limited set of governmental instruments.2 Thus, it neglects combined effects
of multiple income risk, faced by households and the fact that the government can
1See Atkinson (2008) for a recent overview, showing several ups and downs in skilled and
unskilled wages over the last century.
2An overview on related literature is provided in the next section.
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use a wide set of instruments for public policy, including progressive taxation and
educational policy.
Accordingly extending the scope of such optimal taxation models, the ques-
tions, emerging and being tackled in this paper, are: (i) What is the optimal tax
structure in order to cope with multiple income risk in human and real capital,
and in which way is public policy challenged by multiple risk? (ii) Which ef-
fects on the optimal trade-off between efficiency and insurance will emerge? (iii)
Are direct or indirect instruments better to counter inefficiencies in human capital
formation caused by taxation, hence, is it better to use tuition fees (or education
subsidies) or capital taxation?
This paper shows that the government can provide efficient diversification of
both (aggregate) wage and capital risk between private and public consumption,
increasing the set of socially available assets, if leisure demand is inelastic, and if
the government has access to differentiated wage taxation, tuition fees/education
subsidies and a capital tax, which is only levied on the excess return in the risky
asset.
Taxation of skilled wages and excess returns in real capital shifts risk into pub-
lic consumption and decreases the variance in private consumption. The nec-
essary tax rates increase in private relative to public risk aversion. Whilst the
exact tax structure depends on this risk aversion in private and public consump-
tion, riskless interest income should not be taxed in any case. If risk aversion is
sufficiently high, we will end up with progressive wage taxation and education
subsidies, backing most (Northern) European tax and education systems. En-
dogenizing leisure demand will complicate the analysis very much, and explicit
solutions can hardly be derived. Instead, we provide some intuitive conjectures,
based on results in simplified models.
For providing this missing link in normative theory of taxation under uncer-
tainty, we set up an OLG-model, where households live for two periods. In their
first period of life, they decide on educational investment, on overall savings and
on portfolio choice between a risky and a riskless asset. Furthermore, they supply
unskilled labor. In their second period, households are faced by risk in both return
to real capital and wage income, they receive as skilled workers. The risks are
due to stochastic technological shocks, which can increase the productivity of real
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capital, but can also cause depreciations in the capital stock. Labor productivity
is affected indirectly by the change in capital productivity and directly by the fact
that technological progress can either be complementary to households’ skills or
depreciate their stock of human capital, in case households cannot handle the new
technology.
The government is supposed to provide funding for the educational sector and
to supply a public consumption good. For financing its expenditure, it can apply
both differentiated taxation of wage income and capital taxes, which are tailored
to specific parts of return – i.e., the excess return, which can be seen as the market
price of aggregate capital risk. Moreover, it can rely on educational policy, as
there are tuition fees or education subsidies.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we provide a discussion on
income risks, on the linkage to human capital and on the possibilities of the gov-
ernment to insure these risks. Section 3 then presents the model and is followed
by the description of household behavior. In section 5 we derive the optimal pub-
lic policy in case of inelastic leisure demand, whereas extensions and omissions
are discussed in section 6. Section 7 closes with some conclusions.
2 Income Risks and Social Insurance by Taxation
Sources of capital risk are manifold: it can be caused by business fluctuations and
therefore by an uncertain profitability of the firm, by technological change, which
can increase capital productivity, but also may cause extraordinary depreciations
in the capital stock. For financial assets, risk can also be due to speculative shocks
within financial capital markets. Sometimes, shocks causing world-wide turmoil
in stock markets can spread out and slow down the real economy, e.g., after the ter-
ror attack on 9/11 2001 and the recent disaster in the US-subprime credit market.
However, aggregate capital risk can still be traded in these capital markets, and
each household can adjust its exposure to risk. Moreover, unsystematic capital
risk can be entirely diversified.
The sources of wage risk are even more various: wage risk can also be caused
by business cycles and technological progress may both increase or decrease the
productivity of (skilled) labor, as well as depreciate the stock of skills. There is
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incidence for an increasing wage gap in skilled and unskilled labor for the last 25
years, driven by globalization and skill-biased technological change (Krugman,
1995, Katz and Autor, 1999). This trend in wage changes is predicted to continue
even more in the future, due to the growth rate of skilled labor supply lacking
behind the demand for skilled workers (Jacobs, 2004) – implying that wages can
be even less forecasted than by now. Atkinson (2008) provides a recent and critical
overview on these topics and shows that there is a strong upward trend in skilled
wages, whereas unskilled wages remain constant or decrease slightly. Moreover,
he shows that there have been several increases and decreases in both skilled and
unskilled wages over the last century.
However, there is an important difference to capital risk: wage risk can neither
be (fully) insured nor traded in private markets.3 Insurance fails due to, e.g., moral
hazard or adverse selection and due to the fact that most people are (legally) too
young for signing binding contracts, when they decide on investing in skilled la-
bor. Trading is impossible, because manpower cannot serve as collateral – at least
as long as slavery is precluded. This risk can therefore also hardly be diversified.
This implies that households must additionally bear idiosyncratic (success) risk
in human capital formation and firm-specific risk at their employers. The latter
implies that an employee additionally has to bear the idiosyncratic risk that its
employer either goes bankrupt or cuts wages in order to avoid mass layoffs. These
ex-post wage cuts have been very popular, e.g., in Germany for the last decade.4
Taken together, there is large variety in wage risk, ranging from unemployment
risk to productivity risk – and even wages, which are fixed ex ante, can be risky
due to the mentioned wage renegotiations.
Higher education is often recommended as substitute for wage insurance.
However, it cuts both ways: On the one hand human capital is in fact an in-
surance against the risk of getting unemployed. Empirical data shows that among
unskilled workers unemployment is – on OECD- respectively on EU19-average –
twice as high as among workers with a degree in upper-secondary education and
3See e.g., Eaton and Rosen (1980b), pp. 707. A comprehensive overview on these arguments
is contained in Sinn (1996). Even public unemployment insurance does not offer full coverage.
4Wage cuts have been mostly implemented by reducing gratifications like Christmas or va-
cation bonus. Wage reduction options are meanwhile a common tool in contracts between trade
unions and employers in Germany.
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even threefold higher than among skilled workers, having finished tertiary educa-
tion (OECD, 2007, Indicator A8). On the other hand human capital investment is
accompanied by the risk to fail in graduation5 as well as it promotes, e.g., occu-
pational risk and the risk of having highly specialized knowledge, which can only
be used in few sectors – consequently, exposing its owner to sector-specific risks
(Wildasin, 2000). Increasing (changing) wage differentials also render returns to
education risky, fitting to the prediction by Mincer (1974). In fact, Carneiro et al
(2003) back the view that graduate wages and returns cannot be predicted at the
time of making the investment into human capital.6
Levhari and Weiss (1974) are first to analyze the effect of a variety of these
wage risks onto human capital investment, while Williams (1978) extends the
analysis onto multiple wage and capital income risk. Both papers show that these
risks have a major impact on household behavior. Furthermore, the latter points
out that investment in human capital and portfolio choice in real capital assets
are strongly linked, if returns to both investments are risky. These papers do,
however, neither deal with public policy nor with insurance possibilities (except
for under-/overinvestment as self-insurance).
Public policy is such a possibility for improving the allocation of risk and for
providing some insurance even in those cases, where the private sector will not
supply insurance against income risk (see Sinn, 1996): By reducing the variance
in ex-post incomes via taxation and by redistributing tax revenue as deterministic
transfers in case of idiosyncratic risk respectively by diversifying aggregate risk
between private and public consumption, taxation can insure these risks. In the
former case, the government can eliminate risk by pooling, thus it bears the risk
at no costs – as long as we abstain from induced distortions.7
The latter case is somewhat more complicated. It appears somehow odd that
the government should be able to deal better with aggregate risk than the private
market, as long as one restricts to public projects, which could (in principle) also
be realized by the private market. There has been a lively debate on that issue,
5Drop-out rates are substantial, being for tertiary education around 30% on OECD-average.
See OECD (2007), Indicator A3 and Table A3.6.
6Another short overview on the interdependency of human capital and various kinds of risk is
to be found in Anderberg and Andersson (2003).
7See Varian (1980) for a detailed discussion.
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and meanwhile it seems widely accepted that for such projects it is reasonable
to assume that private and social valuation and discount factors should be equal.8
Nevertheless, the government can improve the allocation of aggregate risk by sup-
plying a public good, which is not provided by the market and therefore imple-
ment a public project, which is not contained in the private sector.9 This holds
true even if households are entirely diversified in all private assets, because the
public good augments the number of social assets and therefore allows to spread
risk onto more securities.
Optimal risk diversification then implies that aggregate risk is balanced on pri-
vate and public consumption. In a first-best optimum, public insurance guarantees
that the ex-post realized marginal utilities of private and public consumption are
identical in each state of the world, what can be ensured by using state-dependent
lump-sum taxes.10
If state-dependent lump-sum taxes are not available, a trade-off is emerging
between risk diversification and potential distortions. There are several studies,
characterizing second-best optima for different kinds of risk and for a limited
set of public policies: Eaton and Rosen (1980a,b) as well as Hamilton (1987)
point out in case of idiosyncratic wage risk that proportional income taxation and
lump-sum transfers show the mentioned welfare-enhancing insurance effects.11
In a second-best optimum, these insurance effects are balanced against induced
distortions in labor supply and human capital formation. In Hamilton (1987),
moreover, capital taxation can also serve as indirect instrument to correct for dis-
tortions in human capital investment. Based on the Hamilton-model, da Costa and
Maestri (2007) follow a ‘new dynamic public finance’-approach and apply a wide
set of non-linear instruments. Focusing on implicit tax wedges, they show wage
and capital taxation to be desirable, whereas education investment should remain
undistorted. However, an informative optimal tax structure is hard to derive from
8See, e.g., Arrow and Lind (1970) vs. Hirshleifer (1966), Sandmo (1972) or Bailey and Jensen
(1972), whereby the latter denote the assumption of risk neutrality in this case as ‘nirvana ap-
proach,’ because of comparing apples and oranges due to different institutional settings.
9See Kaplow (1994), p. 795 and Myles (1995), p. 210f.
10See, e.g., Christiansen (1995) or Gollier (2001), who relates the sensitivity of consumption to
absolute risk tolerance (p. 313f and Proposition 80).
11Varian (1980) shows similar results in a model with risky return to capital investment and
generalizes the result to non-linear income taxation.
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their tax wedges and implicit tax rates.
In case of business risk, Kanbur (1980) models the occupational choice de-
cision between working as an employee for a deterministic wage, or becoming
entrepreneur and being faced by risk. In the second-best optimum, partial social
insurance by differentiated taxation of both types of workforce is balanced against
distortions in occupational choice.
For (idiosyncratic) risky human capital formation, Garcı´a-Pen˜alosa and Wa¨lde
(2000) examine a broader range of instruments. Basically, they show that a grad-
uate tax, accompanied by some direct education subsidies, is optimal in order to
insure individuals. However, they restrict to a binary risk model, where students
are either successful in investing or not and model the graduate tax as a lump-sum
payment of all graduated households.
A more detailed linkage between wage risk, distortionary taxation, and edu-
cation policy provide Anderberg and Andersson (2003), examining the effect of
several types of wage risk onto tax revenue and welfare. They state that it is op-
timal to overprovide education, if human capital has an insurance function. How-
ever, in their model the government can control all human capital investment by
mandatory education, and there is no private investment decision.
Turning to capital risk, a methodologically corresponding framework to Kan-
bur (1980) can be applied in case of portfolio choice. As shown in Christiansen
(1993), there is an optimal trade-off between distorting investment in risky and
riskless assets and the diversification of aggregate risk between private and public
consumption by implementing differentiated asset-specific tax rates.
Put together, it is neglected to the best of our knowledge in this literature that
households face simultaneously capital and wage risks for different reasons. The
only study focusing on this issue and including human capital investment seems
to be the work by Williams (1978). The optimal public policy in such a case has
never been examined. Additionally, the cited studies restrict to a limited set of
public instruments. This must have effects both on the ability to diversify risk and
on the efficiency costs.
Modeling the effect of multiple risk and enlarging public instruments for dif-
ferentiated wage taxation and tuition fees as well as capital taxes focusing on the
excess return is the challenge to be tackled in the section to come.
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3 The Model
We assume a small open economy with overlapping generations. In each gener-
ation there is a continuum of homogenous households. Each household lives for
two periods, supplies unskilled labor in its first period of life and invests in real
and human capital. Real capital is internationally perfectly mobile, whereas labor
force is entirely immobile.
As each individual lives for two periods, overall population in period t is equal
to Nt−1t +Ntt . Superscript t−1 indicates the old generation, born in period t−1,
whereas superscript t represents the actual young generation in period t. Further-
more, we assume constant and exogenous population growth at rate η, which is
equal to the riskless interest rate r. η = r guarantees the ‘golden rule’ of real
capital accumulation and avoids – without loss of generality – any intertemporal
fiscal externality stemming from dynamical inefficiency (see, e.g, Atkinson and
Sandmo, 1980, or Sandmo, 1985, p. 292).
Production Sector The domestic industry produces a homogenous consump-
tion good y, whose price is normalized to unity. Production can take place in
two sectors: sector 0, exhibiting both deterministic output and costs, and sector 1,
which uses a risky production technology.12
In the deterministic sector 0, the representative firm issues riskless bonds
I0, which pay out return r in order to attract real capital K0, and the firm de-
mands unskilled labor L0. It uses a constant-returns-to-scale production function,
y0 = F0(K0,L0). The riskless interest rate is then determined by perfect capital
mobility and the production function as F0K = r, where F0K is the marginal produc-
tivity of real capital in sector 0. Moreover, international capital flows enforce a
wage rate for unskilled labor of F0L = W 0.
The risky sector 1 utilizes always the latest production technology, which de-
pends on a stochastic technology parameter θ. In each period, there is a capital-
augmenting technological shock, which can on the one hand increase the produc-
tivity of capital, but on the other hand also affects depreciations δ either positively
12The basic set-up equals Stiglitz (1972), and extends his model for both skilled and unskilled
labor as well as endogenous human capital formation.
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or negatively. Moreover, this technology requires skilled labor H to be used. The
production function then takes the form y1 = F1(K1,H,θ).
The representative firm issues stocks I1, which deliver a stochastic return x˜
in order to attract venture capital for production. Employment of capital fol-
lows from marginal productivity equal to capital costs. This can be rearranged
to F1K(K1,H,θ)−δ(θ) = x˜. In the good states of the world, capital productivity is
increased by the technological shock and depreciations are low, resulting in a high
return to venture capital. In the bad states of the world, however, capital produc-
tivity is unaffected or even lowered by the shock, and it turns out that the capital
stock has fully depreciated at the end of the production process. If this happens,
the return to capital turns out to be negative or capital is even lost entirely. Taken
together, the return to venture capital has in principle support x˜ ∈ [−1;∞].
Accordingly, we obtain the optimal demand for human capital from
F1H(K1,H,θ) = ˜W 1. The marginal productivity of human capital depends twofold
on the technological shock: First, there is an indirect effect via the productivity of
capital. If the utilization of real capital changes, this should also affect the produc-
tivity of and the demand for human capital. Second, there is also a direct effect,
which is independent of the productivity change in real capital. The productivity
of human capital is directly affected by the capability to utilize the new technol-
ogy. It may turn out that the qualifications of skilled workers are not sufficient
in order to handle the new technology properly, or it might happen that the new
technology is easier to cope with given a certain type of qualification. Thus, even
if the shock increases (decreases) real capital productivity worldwide, it may oc-
cur in some countries that human capital productivity decreases (increases). This
direct effect is a country-specific shock and is driven by differentiated education
systems, where different skills might be acquired across countries. If marginal
productivity of skilled workers becomes too low, however, they can supply their
labor force in the riskless sector. In the riskless sector, human capital is useless,
and the skilled just imitate the unskilled. Taken together, the wage rate of skilled
labor has support ˜W 1 ∈ [ W 0g(E) ;∞].
Households The risk averse households are provided with one unit of time per
period. In their first period of life, they decide to spend time e at university in
9
order to accumulate human capital. Time 1− et−1 is supplied at wage rate W 0
as unskilled labor. Hence, pre-tax income in that period is W 0 · (1− et−1). First-
period income is split on consumption ct−1, and savings st−1. Hereby, savings can
be allocated in two assets: the amount A0t−1 is invested in riskless bonds, which
deliver a return r before capital taxation; the amount A1t−1 is invested in a risky
asset, which supplies the risky production sector with real capital. It pays out a
stochastic pre-tax return x˜, being due to aggregate risk. Overall savings can be
written as st−1 = A0t−1 +A1t−1.13
In their second period of life, labor supply of households is inelastic and they
supply one unit of time. If they are employed in the risky sector, their effective
labor supply in units of skilled labor depends on the amount of human capital
acquired. Human capital is accumulated according to a concave production func-
tion g(e) and increases in the time spent at university, that is g′(e) > 0, g′′(e) < 0
and g˜(0) = 1. Thus, effective human capital supply is g(e), labor market equilib-
rium implies Ht = g(et−1), and pre-tax labor income in the second period equals
˜W 1 · g(e). The latter is risky in aggregate, due to a stochastic wage rate ˜W 1. The
lower bound of labor income is the unskilled wage income W 0, because if the
marginal productivity in human capital and skilled labor income becomes too
low, g(e) · ˜W 1 < W 0, the skilled households decide to work in the riskless sec-
tor 0. Here they cannot utilize their human capital and supply one unit of labor at
the unskilled wage rate W 0.
Following the mainstream of the literature, we will assume that wage risks in
human capital can neither be insured against nor can be traded (see Sinn, 1996).
In any case, consumption when old, Ct , has to be financed from two risky earnings
bases, namely stochastic labor income and risky capital income.
Government The government on the one hand provides a pure public consump-
tion good Pt . On the other hand, the government also has to provide a public higher
education system, which causes real resource costs ¯B per student. This expendi-
ture is assumed to be fixed per student and independent from time investment e.
The government charges, however, a price pB per semester and can exclude stu-
13Using m as a country index, world capital market equilibrium then implies ∑m A0m = ∑m I0m
and ∑m A1m = ∑m I1m in each period of time.
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dents, who are not willing to pay pB per unit of time spent at university, e. This
price for education can be seen as tuition fees per semester, if pB > 0, or it will
turn into education subsidies, if pB < 0. The overall net public expenditure for
education in period t is then given by
Bnett = Ntt · ( ¯B− pB · et) . (1)
Taken together, overall public expenditure in period t is
Rt = Pt +Bnett = Pt +Ntt · ( ¯B− pB · et) . (2)
In order to finance its expenditure, the government can use a set of labor and
capital income taxes. For labor taxation, we apply a Norwegian-type two-bracket
tax schedule as in Nielsen and Sørensen (1997): All labor income until a threshold
X = W 0 is liable to the labor tax rate tL1 . The part of labor income, exceeding this
threshold, consequently the skill premium ˜W 1 ·g(e)−W 0, is liable to the labor tax
rate tL2 . Therefore, unskilled workers are only faced by the tax rate tL1 , whereas the
marginal tax rate of the skilled ones is equal to the surtax rate tL2 .
Capital taxation is also differentiated: Riskless capital income in both assets
is taxed at rate tK0 . The excess return in the risky asset, x˜− r, thus the price
received for incurring risk, is taxed instead at rate tK1 . In the latter tax base, full
loss offset is guaranteed. This implies a refund of tK1 · (x˜− r) per unit of risky
capital investment, A1, if x˜− r turns ex-post out to be negative. The modeling of
the capital tax corresponds to the Norwegian shareholder income tax and allows
to tax capital risk directly (see Sørensen, 2005, and Schindler, 2008).
Risk in the Economy and Timing Structure There are two different income
risks in the economy, which depend both on the technology shock. First, this
shock can be seen as capital-augmenting technological progress. However, it is
ex-ante uncertain, whether production is really enhanced and what the effects on
depreciation costs are. We assume that this shock strikes all firms in the risky
sector in all countries at the same time and in the same manner. Hence, the shock
cannot be insured and it translates into aggregate income risk for stock holders.
Second, the technological shock affects human capital in the risky sector
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twofold: (i) There is an indirect effect via the productivity of venture capital. It
seems reasonable to assume that the productivity of skilled labor is ceteris paribus
increased (decreased), if the productivity of real capital increases (decreases). (ii)
There is also a direct impact of the technological shock. We assume that the
capability of skilled labor to utilize the new technology depends on the skills ac-
quired at university and differs across the countries. The reasoning behind this
is the implicit assumption that there are international differences in the educa-
tional systems. Accordingly, this corresponds to an asymmetric shock. In some
countries human capital productivity may be enhanced, whereas, in extremum, in
some other, few, countries, the skilled workers cannot use the new technology at
all. In the latter case, there will be no production in the risky sector and all skilled
workers will supply one unit of unskilled labor in the deterministic sector. As
labor force is internationally immobile, human capital risk still cannot be insured
against (internationally). Hence, the effects of the technological shock translate
into aggregate labor income risk for skilled workers as well. From the government
point of view, both the labor income tax base and the capital income tax base are
partly risky, and, thus, overall tax revenue is stochastic, too.
The timing structure and the realization of risk is as follows: First, the benev-
olent government sets welfare-maximizing tax rates and tuition fees. Second, the
young generation decides for its human capital investments, optimal savings and
portfolio allocation. Next, the impact of the technological shock θ on venture and
human capital realizes, real capital is allocated worldwide, and the skilled workers
decide to work either in the risky sector or in the deterministic one. Then, produc-
tion takes place, and the real value of depreciation in venture capital, δ(θ) realizes.
Finally, all incomes and taxes are paid, and private as well as public consumption
take place.
4 Household Choice
An individual, born in period t − 1, maximizes its von-Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility function
Z = E[U(ct−1,ct)]+E[V ( ˜Pt)] (3)
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by choosing its optimal educational investment et−1, its consumption ct−1 and its
investments in the riskless and the risky financial asset, ASt−1 and ARt−1, respec-
tively.
We assume the utility function to be additively separable in private and public
consumption. Moreover, the individual does not anticipate any effects of its be-
havior on the level or the riskiness of the public good, because each household is
arbitrarily small.
The budget constraint of the household under consideration is in period t− 1
given by
(1− tL1 ) ·W 0t−1 · (1− et−1) = ct−1 + pB · et−1 +ASt−1 +ARt−1, (4)
and human capital formation and savings translate into second-period-of-life con-
sumption14
c˜t = (1− tL2 ) ·
[
˜W 1 ·g(et−1)−W 0
]
− tL1 ·W 0 +(1− tK1 )(x˜− r) ·ARt−1
+[1+ r(1− tK0 )] ·
[
ASt−1 +A
R
t−1
]
. (5)
Consolidating these expressions leads to the intertemporal budget constraint
c˜t = (1− tL2 ) ·
[
˜W 1 ·g(et−1)−W 0
]
− tL1 ·W 0 +(1− tK1 )(x˜− r) ·ARt−1
+[1+ r(1− tK0 )] ·
[
(1− tL1 ) ·W 0t−1 · (1− et−1)− ct−1− pB · et−1
]
, (6)
whereby (1−tL1 ) ·W 0t−1 ·(1−et−1)−ct−1− pB ·et−1 = ASt1 +A
R
t−1 = st−1 are overall
savings.
Thus, the household solves
max
ct−1,ARt−1,et−1
E[U(ct−1, c˜t)]+E[V (Pt)] s.t. (6). (7)
14All variables indicated with a tilde depend on the realization of θ and are stochastic.
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First order conditions are
E[Uct−1]− p ·E[Uct ] = 0 (8)
(1− tK1 ) ·E[Uct · (x˜− r)] = 0 (9)
E
[
Uct ·
{
(1− tL2 ) · ˜W 1t ·g′(et−1)− p ·
(
(1− tL1 ) ·W 0 + pB
)}]
= 0, (10)
where p = 1+ r(1− tK0 ).
From (8) we infer the usual condition that the marginal rate of time prefer-
ences, ρ = E[Uct−1]/E[Uct ]−1, must be equal to the riskless after-tax interest rate,
accordingly ρ = r(1− tK0 ).
First order condition (9) implies that the risk tax tK1 on the excess return in the
risky financial asset only has a Musgrave-substitution effect,15
∂ARt−1
∂tK1
=
ARt−1
1− tK1
, (11)
which reduces return, variance and all higher moments in the same way and which
does not affect welfare from private consumption. Therefore it has neither effect
on consumption ct−1 nor on educational investment et−1. Thus, we have ∂ct−1∂tK1 =
∂et−1
∂tK1
= 0. All of this can easily be understood by using the optimal investment
function ARt−1(tK1 ) =
ARt−1
1−tK1
in the household budget constraint (6).
Last, but not least, we draw from (10) that the effective risk-adjusted marginal
return to human capital will be equalized to the after-tax marginal return in riskless
real capital and
(1− tL2 ) · (1−pic( ˜W 1)) · ¯W1 ·g′(et−1)
(1− tL1 ) ·W 0 + pB
−1 = r(1− tK0 ), (12)
whereby we have been using the certainty equivalent
W 1adC =
E[Uct · ˜W 1]
E[Uct ]
= E[ ˜W 1]+
Cov(Uct , ˜W 1)
E[Uct ]
= ¯W 1 · (1−pic( ˜W 1)), (13)
15This effect is well-known in the literature on risk taking and taxation. See, e.g., Mossin
(1968), Sandmo (1969, 1977).
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and ¯W 1 = E[ ˜W 1], as well as pic( ˜W 1) = −Cov(Uct ,
˜W 1)
E[Uct ]· ¯W 1
. pic( ˜W 1) ∈ (0,1] is the nor-
malized risk premium demanded in private consumption in order to bear the wage
risk of an high-skilled worker. It acts like an implicit tax on (expected) skilled
wage income.
From (13) and the first order condition (9) we can also infer an effect of the
fact that human capital risk cannot be traded, whilst risk in real capital can be sold
and bought via the risky asset. Equation (9) implies that the household is perfectly
diversified in all real capital assets, because in the optimum the risk adjusted return
of another marginal unit in the risky asset equals exactly the return in the riskless
asset. By rearranging the optimality condition, we receive
E[x˜− r] =−
Cov(Uct , x˜)
E[Uct ]
= RPc(x˜). (14)
The certainty equivalent is given by the riskless market return. The household’s
absolute risk premium in real capital, RPc(x˜), can therefore be inferred from mar-
ket data, E[x˜−r], and taxing the excess return x˜−r allows to tax the risk premium
itself.
Transforming (13), the absolute risk premium in human capital is equal to
RPc( ˜W 1) = ¯W 1 ·pic( ˜W 1) =−
Cov(Uct , ˜W 1)
E[Uct ]
= ¯W 1−W 1adc , (15)
but market data does not provide any information on the certainty equivalent W 1adc .
The skill premium ˜W 1 ·g(e)−W 0 can be seen as a possible approximation for
tax purposes, but it still mixes up the expected return to human capital and its
risk premium. Thus, it seems not to be possible to tax the risk premium in wage
income alone.16 Moreover, it indicates that the household is not able to diversify
the wage risk entirely.
Optimal household behavior determines the indirect utility function
Ω(tL1 , tL2 , tK0 , tK1 , pB) = E[U(c∗t−1,c∗t )]+E[V ( ˜Pt)], (16)
16Of course, it is possible to solve equation (12) for the risk premium RPc( ˜W 1), but this will not
deliver a suitable tax base.
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and applying the Envelope-theorem leads to
∂Ω
∂tL1
= −W 0 · [1+ p · (1− e∗t−1)] ·E[Uct ] (17)
∂Ω
∂tL2
= E[Uct · (W
0
− ˜W 1 ·g(e∗t−1))]
= −
[
(1−pic( ˜W 1)) · ¯W 1 ·g(e∗t−1)−W 0
]
·E[Uct ] (18)
∂Ω
∂tK0
= −r · s∗t−1 ·E[Uct ] (19)
∂Ω
∂tK1
= −AR∗t−1 ·E[Uct · (x˜− r)] = 0 (20)
∂Ω
∂pB
= −p · e∗t−1 ·E[Uct ], (21)
where the second equality in equation (20) stems from the household first order
condition (9) and confirms our arguments given above for the effects of tK1 in
comparative statics.
5 Optimal Public Policy
The government provides a pure public good, Pt = Nt−1t ·Gt , and also has to pro-
vide a higher education system, publicly financed, which causes fixed costs ¯B per
student. Whilst the level of the public good can vary, dependent on tax revenue,
the education system must be fully funded in each state of nature.
Subtracting revenue from tuition fees, the overall (net) public expenditure for
education in period t is given by
Bnett = Ntt · ( ¯B− pB · e∗t ) . (22)
Summed up, overall public net expenditure in period t is
˜Rt = Nt−1t · ˜Gt +Ntt · ( ¯B− pB · e∗t ) , (23)
whereby ˜Gt are the units of the public good per member of the old generation.
In order to finance its expenditure, the government can use the set of wage and
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capital income taxes stated in section 3. Labor income up to a threshold W 0 is
liable to the wage tax rate tL1 . The part of labor income, exceeding this threshold,
is liable to the wage tax rate tL2 . Riskless capital income in both assets is taxed at
rate tK0 , whereas the excess return in the risky asset, x˜− r, is taxed at rate tK1 . In
the latter tax base, full loss offset is guaranteed.
All together, the government receives in each period t wage tax revenue Ntt ·
tL1 ·W 0 · (1− e∗t ) from the young generation. The old generation pays wage taxes
Nt−1t · tL1 ·W 0 at the standard rate and, additionally, has to pay N
t−1
t · t
L
2 · [ ˜W 1 ·
g(e∗t−1)−W0] under the surtax rate. The latter tax base is risky in aggregate, but as
the income of a skilled worker cannot be lower than the wage paid in the riskless
unskilled sector, W 0, this tax base cannot be negative, thus [ ˜W 1 ·g(e∗t−1)−W 0]≥ 0.
The governmental budget restriction for period t is therefore given by
Nt−1t ·
{
tL2 ·
[
˜W 1 ·g(e∗t−1)−W 0
]
+ tL1 ·W 0
}
+Ntt · tL1 ·W 0 · (1− e∗t )+ (24)
Nt−1t ·
{
tK1 · (x˜− r) ·ARt−1 + tK0 r ·
[
(1− tL1 ) ·W 0 · (1− e∗t−1)− pB · e∗t−1− c∗t−1
]}
= ˜Rt = Nt−1t · ˜Gt +Ntt ·
(
¯B− pB · e∗t−1
)
.
Rearranging and transforming into a per-capita constraint results in
tL2 ·
[
˜W 1 ·g(e∗t−1)−W 0
]
+ tL1 ·W 0 +(1+ r) ·
[
tL1 ·W 0 · (1− e∗t )+ pB · e∗t
]
+tK1 · (x˜− r) ·AR∗t−1 + tK0 r · s∗t−1− (1+ r) · ¯B = ˜Gt , (25)
where we used Ntt /Nt−1t = 1+η = 1+r and s∗t−1 = (1− tL1 ) ·W 0 ·(1−e∗t−1)− pB ·
e∗t−1− c
∗
t−1. As the education system is always fully funded, the consumption of
the public good ˜Gt turns risky, as it is financed by risky tax revenue.
The government maximizes expected utility of a representative steady-state
generation, born at t−1.17 Using the indirect utility function (16), the optimiza-
tion problem can be stated as
max
tL1 ,t
L
2 ,t
K
0 ,t
K
1 ,pB
Nt−1t ·Ω(tL1 , tL2 , tK0 , tK1 , pB, ¯B)+E
[
V (Nt−1t · ˜Gt)
]
, (26)
17This approach is compatible with a Pareto-improving tax reform as in Nielsen and Sørensen
(1997), if we redefine expenditure ¯B and add debt payments necessary in order to keep the utility
of the transition generation constant.
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where ˜Gt is subject to the budget restriction (25). Given the steady-state assump-
tion, we are going to drop the superscripts for generations and time indices, when-
ever possible without causing confusion, in order to simplify the notation.
The first order conditions are
−W 0 · [1+ p · (1− e∗)] ·E[Uct ] + (27)
E
{
VG ·
[
W 0 [1+ p · (1− e∗)]+ α˜ · ∂e∂tL1
+ tK1 · (x˜− r) ·
∂AR
∂tL1
− tK0 r ·
∂c−1
∂tL1
]}
= 0,
−
[
(1−pic( ˜W 1)) · ¯W 1 ·g(e∗)−W 0
]
·E[Uct ] + (28)
E
{
VG ·
[
˜W 1 g(e∗)−W 0 + α˜ · ∂e∂tL2
+ tK1 · (x˜− r) ·
∂AR
∂tL2
− tK0 r ·
∂c−1
∂tL2
]}
= 0,
−r · s∗ ·E[Uct ] + (29)
E
{
VG ·
[
r s+ α˜ ·
∂e
∂tK0
+ tK1 · (x˜− r) ·
∂AR
∂tK0
− tK0 r ·
∂c−1
∂tK0
]}
= 0,
E
{
VG ·
[
(x˜− r) AR∗+ α˜ ·
∂e
∂tK1
+ tK1 · (x˜− r) ·
∂AR
∂tK1
− tK0 r ·
∂c−1
∂tK1
]}
= 0,(30)
−p · e∗ ·E[Uct ] + (31)
E
{
VG ·
[
p e∗+ α˜ ·
∂e
∂pB
+ tK1 · (x˜− r) ·
∂AR
∂pB
− tK0 r ·
∂c−1
∂pB
]}
= 0,
whereby α˜ = tL2 · ˜W 1 · g′(e∗)− (1 + r)
[
tL1 ·W 0− pB
]
− tK0 r ·
[
(1− tL1 ) ·W 0 + pB
]
represents the (stochastic) net tax wedge on education, whilst c−1 indicates con-
sumption in the first period of life and where we have already inserted the
envelope-effects (17) – (21) for the derivatives of the indirect utility function.
As we have ∂e∂tK1
= ∂c−1∂tK1
= 0 and ∂AR∂tK1
= A
R
1−tK1
from (11) and comparative-statics,
first order condition (30) simplifies to
E [VG · (x˜− r)] ·
A1
1− tK1
= 0 ⇔ E [VG · (x˜− r)] = 0. (32)
Consequently, a marginal increase in the tax rate tK1 will create additional tax
revenue of x˜− r, however, in the optimum the risk adjusted value of this (addi-
tional) marginal tax revenue must be zero.
Next, we define analogous to W 1adc
W 1adG =
E
[
VG · ˜W 1
]
E [VG]
=
E [VG] ·E[ ˜W 1]
E [VG]
+
Cov(VG, ˜W 1)
E [VG]
= ¯W 1 ·(1−piG( ˜W 1)). (33)
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W 1adG is the risk adjusted skilled wage, whereby the adjustment is now based
on public consumption. It is equal to the expected skilled wage, E[ ˜W 1] = ¯W ,
minus the absolute risk premium measured in public consumption, RPG( ˜W 1) =
−
Cov(VG,g˜(E))
E[VG] .
Using equations (32) and (33) in the other first order conditions, we obtain
W 0 · [1+ p · (1− e∗)] · E [Uct −VG]
E [VG]
= β · ∂e∂tL1
+ tK0 r ·
∂c−1
∂tL1
, (34)
[
W 1adc ·g(e
∗)−W 0
]
·
E [Uct ]
E [VG]
−
[
W 1adG ·g(e
∗)−W 0
]
= β · ∂e∂tL2
+ tK0 r ·
∂c−1
∂tL2
, (35)
r · s∗ ·
E [Uct −VG]
E [VG]
= β · ∂e∂tK0
+ tK0 r ·
∂c−1
∂tK0
, (36)
p · e∗ ·
E [Uct −VG]
E [VG]
= β · ∂e∂pB + t
K
0 r ·
∂c−1
∂pB
, (37)
where β = tL2 · (1− piG( ˜W 1)) · ¯W 1 · g′(e∗)− p ·
(
tL1 ·W 0− pB
)
− tK0 r is the risk-
adjusted net revenue from taxing education.
Dividing equation (37) by p · e∗, inserting the new expression in (36), and in
(34) respectively, and rearranging those, reveals:
(
p · e∗ ·
∂e
∂tK0
− r · s∗ ·
∂e
∂pB
)
·β = tK0 r ·
(
p · e∗ ·
∂c−1
∂tK0
− r · s∗ ·
∂c−1
∂pB
)
(38)
(
p e∗
∂e
∂tL1
−W 0 [1+ p (1− e∗)]
∂e
∂pB
)
·β = tK0 r ·
(
p e∗
∂c−1
∂tL1
−
W 0 [1+ p (1− e∗)]
∂c−1
∂pB
)
(39)
We can now state a first result:
Proposition 1. It is not optimal to tax the riskless rate of return in financial assets.
tK0 = 0 also implies that capital taxation is not used as indirect instrument to cor-
rect for labor-tax induced distortions in education demand. Moreover, education
is not taxed on a net basis, β = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 8.1.
As it will turn out later, insurance and risk diversification is carried out by
differentiated wage taxation and the risk tax on the excess return in risky assets.
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Furthermore, educational investment can be controlled by using tuition fees / ed-
ucation subsidies. Hence, there is neither reason for distorting intertemporal con-
sumption choice and educational investment nor any need for taxing (riskless)
capital taxation and education. Accordingly, we have the marginal rate of in-
tertemporal substitution equal to the riskless interest rate, ρ = r, and we have
efficient (risk-adjusted) educational investment.
That the optimal tax system on the one hand actually does not create distor-
tions, but on the other hand is still able to ensure the diversification of wage risk
between private and public consumption in a very efficient manner, can be seen in
Proposition 2:
Proposition 2. Optimal public policy ensures (i) ex-ante efficiency in allocation,
E[Uct ] = E[VG], and (ii) an ex-post wage-risk sharing rule, which equates the
(wage) risk premia in private and public consumption, pic( ˜W 1) = piG( ˜W 1).
Proof. Applying tK0 = β = 0 from Proposition 1, and e∗ < 1 in any of the equations
(34), (36) or (37), results in
E[Uct ] = E[VG], (40)
being exactly the definition of ex-ante efficiency.
Part (ii) can be proven by substituting tK0 = β = 0 in equation (35), where we
obtain [
W 1adc ·g(e
∗)−W 0
]
·
E [Uct ]
E [VG]
−
[
W 1adG ·g(e
∗)−W 0
]
= 0. (41)
Applying E[Uct ] = E[VG] as well as the definition of W 1ada = ¯W
1 ·(1−pia( ˜W 1)), a =
c,G and collecting terms then leads to
pic( ˜W 1)−piG( ˜W 1) = 0. (42)
Thus, the wage risk premia in private and public consumption are equalized for
an optimal public policy. From part (i) and the definitions of pia( ˜W 1), a = c,G
follows as well
Cov(Uct , ˜W 1) = Cov(VG, ˜W 1). (43)
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It is well-known that ex-ante efficiency itself should not be the aim of the gov-
ernment in case of risky economies and incomplete insurance markets (e.g., Eaton
and Rosen, 1980a, Christiansen, 1993), because providing an insurance effect by
taxation can compensate for tax-induced losses in efficiency. However, our broad
set of instruments in combination with exogenous leisure choice simultaneously
allows for both a very efficient diversification of risk, equalizing even the covari-
ances itself, and, in expected terms, efficiency in allocation.
In fact, marginal utilities in private and public consumption are linked by a risk
sharing rule, equating the (private and public) ‘prices’ of wage risk, pic( ˜W 1) =
piG( ˜W 1), and guaranteing that marginal utilities fluctuate in a similar way, but not
causing efficiency costs. Risk is shifted between private and public consumption
by making use of the surtax rate. As will be stated in more detail later, the higher
risk aversion in private consumption is, relative to the one in public consump-
tion, the higher the tax rate tL2 should be. The reason is that the more risk should
be transferred into public consumption, because it is borne there at lower (util-
ity) costs, then. Note, however, that, although this optimal policy is better than
in standard optimal taxation models featuring wage risk (i.e., Eaton and Rosen,
1980b, Kanbur, 1980), the risk sharing rule cannot guarantee a first-best solution,
because the risk is diversified in a linear manner, due to a constant surtax rate t2.
Still it allows to transfer risk from the household to the government and attains
therefore a twofold improvement. First, the household gets enabled to “trade” a
part of its wage risk. Second, the government increases the number of (social)
assets, onto which aggregate risk can be diversified, by providing a public good.
The public good can be seen as an additional asset, which cannot be provided by
the private markets.18 This result does neither imply any assumption, whether the
government can deal better with risk than private markets, nor does it require a
statement, what the correct social discount rate should be.
Turning to insuring risk in real capital investment, we conclude that an equiva-
lent risk diversification rule applies as implied by Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. The optimal capital-risk sharing rule ensures that the normalized
(capital) risk premia in private and public consumption are equalized in equilib-
18See Kaplow (1994), p. 795.
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rium, pic(x˜) = piG(x˜).
Proof. We infer from equations (9) and (32) that
E [Uct · (x˜− r)] = 0 = E [VG · (x˜− r)] . (44)
Applying Steiner’s Rule for covariances and E [Uct ] = E [VG] from (40), as well as
rearranging, we come to
pic(x˜) =−
Cov(Uct ,x)
E [Uct ] ·E[x˜]
=−
Cov(VG,x)
E [VG] ·E[x˜]
= piG(x˜) (45)
The risk in capital income is also diversified between private and public con-
sumption in order to ensure that utility in private and public consumption are
ex-post fluctuating in a desirable way – this time dependent on the realization of
the risky return x˜. This diversification is achieved by the tax rate tK1 onto the ex-
cess return, and the level of this tax rate depends – analogous to the reasoning
given for the level of the tax rate tL2 – on the strength of risk aversion in private
consumption, relative to the one in public consumption.
However, there are two differences between diversifying wage risk and capital
risk. First, optimal capital risk sharing can be implemented without any distor-
tions in households’ behavior and in private consumption. The reason for it is
that it is possible to tax the risk premium directly, which causes only a Musgrave-
substitution effect and leaves utility in private consumption unaffected (i.e., equa-
tion (20)). Second, households are already entirely diversified in capital risk,
therefore, the government cannot improve private risk allocation. However, it
can again provide an increased diversification of risk, because the provision of the
public good, which is not provided by the capital market, increases the number
of socially available assets. Again, the diversification result does not imply any
assumption concerning the social discount rate. As the tax revenue is not redis-
tributed as income, Gordon’s (1985) neutrality result does not apply as well.19
19See also the intuition given for Proposition 2 and section 2.
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Next, we have to determine the optimal tax structure for ensuring the optimal
risk diversification, derived in Propositions 2 and 3.
From β = tK0 = 0 in Proposition 1 and pic( ˜W 1) = piG( ˜W 1) = pi( ˜W 1) in Propo-
sition 2, we can conclude the optimal wage tax structure and the optimal tuition
fees. In the social optimum, we have
β∗ = tL2 · (1−pi( ˜W 1)) · ¯W 1 ·g′(e∗)− (1+ r) ·
(
tL1 ·W 0− pB
)
= 0, (46)
and can add the first order condition (10) from the household’s optimization prob-
lem in order to receive
(1−pi( ˜W 1)) · ¯W 1 ·g′(e∗) = (1+ r) ·W 0. (47)
The LHS of equation (47) gives (social) marginal revenue of optimal educational
investment, whereas the RHS shows its (social) marginal costs, which are equal
to the wage forgone by attending university and bringing forward these costs into
the second period of life.
Note that there is no tax term directly distorting marginal revenue and marginal
costs, and that in case of aggregate risk society is not risk neutral, because risk
cannot be eliminated by pooling. As the term pi( ˜W 1) mirrors optimal wage risk
diversification between private and public consumption, equation (47) can be seen
as stating production efficiency under uncertainty, because optimal human capital
production is not distorted.20
Substituting (47) into (46) leaves us with
tL2 − t
L
1 =−
pB
W 0
. (48)
Proposition 4. The differentiated wage tax and tuition fees are used in order to
guarantee optimal risk diversification without distorting educational investment.
Optimal wage taxation implies either progressive wage taxation tL2 > tL1 and edu-
cation subsidies pB < 0 or regressive wage taxation tL2 < tL1 and tuition fees pB > 0.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 4 is directly taken from (48) and the fact that any
20Production efficiency to be desirable in second-best models dates back to the analysis of
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). However, they restrict to the case of certainty.
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distortive wage taxation is fully compensated by either tuition fees, pB > 0, or
education subsidies, pB < 0. Remind that production efficiency thereby implies
(1−pi( ˜W 1))· ¯W 1·g′(e∗)
1+r = W
0 from (47).
As the diversification depends on the strength of risk aversion in private con-
sumption relative to that in public consumption, the tax rate tL2 depends on this
relative strength: The higher risk aversion in private consumption relative to that
in public consumption, the higher the tax rate on the skill premium. The intuition
is as follows: The more disutility in private consumption is caused by risk, relative
to disutility in public consumption, the more wage risk should be transferred to
public consumption.
If the risk aversion in private (public) consumption is sufficiently high (low),
only progressive taxation tL2 > tL1 ensures optimal risk diversification. However,
this must be complemented by an education subsidy pB < 0 in order to avoid dis-
incentive effects on human capital investment, because progressive wage taxation
implies ceteris paribus a tax burden on education. Thereby, the tax differential
in percent should equal the ratio between the subsidy per semester, pB and wage
earnings per unit of time, W 0. If the household is little risk averse in private con-
sumption, or the optimal tax rate tL1 is very high because of the need to finance
large public spending, the optimal wage tax structure can turn out to be regres-
sive. In this case tuition fees pB > 0 are required to secure efficiency in allocation,
as tax regression acts as education subsidy.
Proposition 4 fits to the results of optimal wage taxation in case of idiosyncratic
risky human capital formation. If the risk is idiosyncratically distributed, the so-
ciety itself is risk neutral in public consumption. Thus, the optimal surtax rate
would be equal to one, if skilled labor was inelastic, and all disincentive effects
could be controlled by education subsidies (see Schindler and Yang, 2007).
In a nutshell, a strong linkage between wage taxation and education policy
is once more needed in order to improve or even restore efficiency, while the
differentiated wage tax allows to follow another aim. This principle is well-known
as ‘Siamese Twins’- concept by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005).21
21In Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) this second aim is income redistribution, whilst in our paper
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The optimal capital tax structure is implied by Propositions 1 and 3: The (vir-
tually) riskless return r to each asset is tax-exempted, tK0 = 0, and a positive tax
rate tK1 > 0 is applied on the excess return x˜− r in the risky asset.22
Both the surtax rate on the skill premium, tL2 , and the tax rate on the excess
return, tK1 , are determined solely by risk considerations. Looking at Propositions
2 and 3, we can infer that tL2 , tK1 → 0 if households are close to risk neutrality
in private consumption and tL2 = tK1 = 1 if households are risk neutral in public
consumption.
Unfortunately, on this level of generality, it is very difficult to derive more
clear-cut results or to provide explicit optimal taxation rules for tL2 and tK1 . There-
fore, we will now assume that the technological shock θ and with it the risky
rate of return x˜ and the skilled wage ˜W 1 are normally distributed. If so, pri-
vate and public consumption, ct and Gt , are normal, too, and we can apply a
Rubinstein-Theorem in order to relate the optimal tax rates to global risk aversion
GARA(a) =−E[Uaa]E[Ua] , a = c,G, in private and public consumption, as defined, e.g.,
in Varian (1992, p. 380).
From rearranging Propositions 2 and 3, it turns out
tL2
1− tL2
=
GARA(ct)
GARA(G) =
tK1
1− tK1
, (49)
and we conclude
Proposition 5. The optimal tax rates for insurance (i) equally depend on the ratio
of global risk aversion in private and public consumption, (ii) are increasing in
risk aversion in private consumption and (iii) decrease in risk aversion in public
consumption. This holds true at least as long the risky return to capital x˜ and the
skilled wage ˜W 1 are normally distributed.
Proof. See Appendix 8.2
Equation (49) supports all the intuition and results concerning the tax rates tL2
and tK1 , given above for Propositions 2 to 4. Moreover, it provides an explicit tax
the differentiation is required in order to secure an optimal diversification of risk between all social
assets.
22It is straightforward to show that optimally tK1 ∈ (0,1), because Proposition 3 and equation
(45) cannot be fulfilled else.
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rule, which can be seen as approximation for more general probability distribu-
tions of wages and capital returns.
Combining our results in Propositions 2 and 3 for general distributions again,
optimal risk-sharing in wage and capital income finally implies
pic( ˜W 1)
pic(x˜)
=
piG( ˜W 1)
piG(x˜)
, (50)
and we end up with equal proportions of risk premia in human versus real capital.
Accordingly:
Corollary 1. There is an indirect risk diversification effect in wage and capital
risk, equating the relative normalized risk premia pia( ˜W
1)
pia(x˜)
, a = ct ,G of human
versus real capital investment between private and public consumption.
Thus, the two relative ‘prices’ of human versus real capital risk, measured on
the one hand by private consumption and on the other hand by public consump-
tion, are balanced by an optimal tax and education policy.
Putting it all together, as long as leisure demand is inelastic, a tax system,
incorporating a differentiated wage tax combined with either tuition fees or edu-
cation subsidies and a risk tax on excess returns in real capital assets, can ensure
efficient risk diversification of aggregate income risk between private and public
consumption, whereby all risk premia are equated. Moreover, such a tax system
does not cause any inefficiencies or distortions.
Hence, although human capital and real capital investment under risk are
strongly linked, as shown by Williams (1978), and although neither the risk pre-
mium in wage income can be taxed separately, nor the households’ risk can be
fully diversified (due to incomplete insurance markets regarding human capital
risk), the presence of multiple aggregate risk does not cause major problems for
an optimal tax and public policy – as long as the government has access to suffi-
cient and suitable instruments.
However, this might change, if one introduces endogenous labor supply. In this
case it is of importance that only the entire skill premium in human capital, but
not the compensation for wage risk alone can be taxed.
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6 Extensions and Omissions
To assume that leisure demand is exogenously given, is of course a very restric-
tive assumption. It is helpful to derive explicit solutions, because this is hardly
possible, if there are multiple income risks and endogenous leisure demand, but
we must be aware that we neglect substantial welfare costs of taxation. There-
fore, we are going to provide some intuition on which effects should be expected
in an extended setting, and we will thereby refer to results in other papers, using
simplified models.
In case of endogenous leisure choice, it is well-known from Atkinson and
Sandmo (1980) that it is optimal to balance overall excess-burden on distortions
in labor supply and savings – except for special cases, where there is weak sep-
arability in leisure. Moreover, Jacobs (2005) shows that endogenous educational
investment increases the elasticity of labor supply and therefore efficiency costs of
labor taxation. Thus, implementing this in Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) should
decrease the tax burden on labor. Next, Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) state that,
even in the case of weak separability in leisure, a positive tax burden on the (risk-
less) return to real capital can be useful as indirect instrument in order to mitigate
distortions in human capital taxation.
However, all these papers focus on deterministic incomes. The model, most
similar to the present one, is in Schindler (2006). He examines the optimal tax
structure, using a proportional labor tax and the same capital tax system as we do,
but focuses on a model, where only capital returns are risky in aggregate. While
using endogenous labor supply, he neglects human capital investment and labor
supply in the second period of life.
Schindler (2006) shows that the risk tax on the excess return allows to sepa-
rate the risk issue and that in this case a twofold trade-off is emerging. First, the
equivalent optimal taxation rule for deterministic labor and capital income like in
Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) applies. This will most likely lead to underprovision
of the public good. The latter determines the second trade-off. Underprovision
can be countered by increasing the tax rate onto the excess return above the rate,
which equates the risk premia in private and public consumption. This will gen-
erate more tax revenue in expected value and mitigate expected underprovision.
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However, this has to be paid with increased risk in public consumption. Thus, the
second trade-off is optimal risk diversification versus underprovision; there are no
additional effects on private consumption.
Embedding all these results above into the results of this paper, allows to state
a conjecture, how endogenous leisure demand will influence our conclusions:
Conjecture 1. If leisure demand is endogenous in both periods of life, it is most
likely that, compared to the results in section 5,
(i) deterministic interest income will be taxed at a positive rate.
(ii) the tax rate tL2 on the skill premium will be decreased, and there is only
suboptimal risk shifting to public consumption.
(iii) progression of the wage tax will be increased (decreased), if unskilled la-
bor supply is more (less) elastic than skilled labor supply. The opposite
holds true in case of regressive taxation. Moreover, in case of progressive
labor taxation, capital taxation acts as indirect subsidy to education, and
education subsidies pB should be expected to decrease. If labor taxation is
regressive, instead, positive capital taxation should increase tuition fees.
(iv) the tax rate tK1 on the excess return should be increased, in order to gener-
ate more expected tax revenue and to mitigate the underprovision with the
public good. This will be repaid by increased risk in public consumption,
thus there will be too much social risk than compared to Proposition 3.
The intuition for that conjecture is as follows: If distortions in labor supply
cannot be avoided, it is optimal to balance the distortions over labor supply, sav-
ings and human capital investment. As taxation gets now more expensive, this
will shift the trade-off away from risk diversification and towards efficiency. The
major problem here is that there is no equivalent in wage taxation to the risk tax in
real capital, which only targets the risk premium. Any wage tax will not only shift
risk, but also cause disincentives, which cannot be fully controlled by educational
policy.
Moreover, the more elastic a tax base is, the less should be its tax burden, then.
This explains the first set of effects in part (iii). As capital taxation subsidizes
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human capital investment, direct subsidies can decrease even more, as they would
anyway. However, if the wage tax is regressive, subsidizing itself education, and
tuition fees are used, the latter should be increased, in case there is positive capital
taxation. The result in (iv) follows directly from the shift in the trade-off between
efficiency and risk diversification in capital risk and the discussion of Schindler
(2006).
Whereas introducing endogenous leisure demand seems to have strong effects
on the results, it is straightforward to introduce several risky assets. This can be
done by assuming several sectors employing both a risky technology and skilled
labor. As long as the Markowitz-case can be applied, each household will then
hold a fully diversified, identical market portfolio of risky assets. Taxing the ex-
cess return in each risky asset with the risk tax rate tK1 will have the same effects
as in the present model, where the risky asset can be interpreted as the market
portfolio of all risky assets (see also Schindler, 2006, relying on Sandmo, 1977).
In a nutshell, several risky assets should not change optimal public policy.
Another neglected item is unemployment risk. In fact, households are faced ei-
ther with substantial unemployment risk or with risky income as unskilled worker.
Due to competitive labor markets, our model cannot give any information about
unemployment and education as insurance device. Of course, it is possible to
model the flip side of the coin, stochastic unskilled labor income, but in our set-
ting this is also of limited use, as households are unskilled in the first period only
– before acquiring education. Although the absence of wage risk in the unskilled
sector is on the one hand a deficiency of the model, it allows on the other hand for
clear-cut results on optimal tax systems for skilled households.
7 Conclusions
We have shown that the government can provide efficient risk diversification be-
tween private and public consumption and that it can create an institution to ‘trade’
a part of uninsurable wage risk by using differentiated wage taxes and relying on
adjusted educational policies. The simultaneous presence of risk in human and
real capital does not challenge public policy very much, if it has access to a full
set of instruments and if leisure demand is inelastic. This is in contrast to the
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challenge in the private sector, where the effects of wage and capital risk differ
substantially.
Our results fit into a growing literature, which emphasizes a strong linkage be-
tween optimal tax systems and educational policies. It turns out that in the pres-
ence of risk and sufficient risk aversion in private consumption, it is better to have
ex-post tuition fees, thus, progressive wage taxation, which has to be accompanied
by educational subsidies in order to stabilize human capital investment. This can
be seen as a potential justification for most European education systems, tradi-
tionally not (very much) relying on tuition fees, but on progressive taxation – and
sometimes even tending to offer public scholarships (i.e., in the Nordic countries).
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We start by restating the household budget constraint as
p · c∗−1 + c˜
∗
t + p
e f f
e · e
∗ = (1− tL2 ) ·
[
˜W 1 ·g(e∗)−W 0
]
− tL1 ·W 0
+(1− tK1 )(x˜− r) ·AR∗+ p · (1− tL1 ) ·W 0, (51)
where pe f fe = p · pe = p ·
[
(1− tL1 ) ·W 0 + pB
]
is the effective (inflated) price of
education and where the RHS of (51) mirrors total income, which has to be con-
sidered for the endowment effects, when the Slutsky decomposition is applied.
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The required Slutsky decompositions are therefore
∂c−1
∂pB
=
[
Sc−1e− e
∗
·
∂c−1
∂I
]
· p, (52)
∂c−1
∂tL1
= (−W 0) ·Sc−1e · p−W
0
· [1+ p · (1− e∗)] · ∂c−1∂I , (53)
∂c−1
∂tK0
=
∂c−1
∂p ·
∂p
∂tK0
+
∂c−1
∂pe f fe
·
∂pe f fe
∂tK0
=
[
Sc−1c−1 + pe ·Sc−1e + s
∗
·
∂c−1
∂I
]
· (−r), (54)
∂e
∂pB
=
[
See− e ·
∂e
∂I
]
· p, (55)
∂e
∂tL1
= (−W 0) ·See · p−W 0 · [1+ p · (1− e∗)] ·
∂e
∂I , (56)
∂e
∂tK0
=
∂e
∂p ·
∂p
∂tK0
+
∂e
∂pe f fe
·
∂pe f fe
∂tK0
=
[
Sc−1e + pe ·See + s
∗
·
∂c−1
∂I
]
· (−r). (57)
Thereby, Si j represents the substitution effect in demand for good i, if price j
changes, and the partial derivative with respect to I indicates the corresponding
income/endowment effect.
By replacing all derivatives in equations (38) and (39) by the expressions
above, all income effects cancel out, and further simplification leaves us in (39)
with
Sc−1e ·β = Sc−1c−1 · tK0 r. (58)
Using (58) in order to simplify (38) even more, we end up with equation (59)
as
See ·β = Sc−1e · tK0 r. (59)
Combining (58) and (59) by substituting for β, results in
(
See ·Sc−1c−1 −Sc−1e ·Sec−1
)
· tK0 r = 0. (60)
The first term in (60) is a principal minor of the substitution matrix, which is
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known to be negative (semi-)definite. As long as we rule out semi-definiteness,
this expression cannot be equal to zero, and consequently we infer tK0 = 0 from
the second term in (60).
Inserting tK0 = 0 in the RHS of (59), we find β = 0, because the substitution
effect in education with respect to the own price is negative, See < 0.
8.2 Proof to Proposition 5
Proof. If two stochastic variables x˜ and y˜ are bivariate normally distributed, a
Rubinstein-theorem (see Rubinstein, 1976, p. 421f) can be applied:
Cov(z(y˜), x˜) = E[z′(y˜)] ·Cov(y˜, x˜) (61)
If the technological shock θ, the asset return x˜ and the skilled wage ˜W 1 are nor-
mal in our model, private consumption c˜t and public consumption ˜Gt are normally
distributed as well (see Varian, 1992, p. 380). In this case, we can reformulate the
covariances in equation (43) as
Cov(Uct , ˜W 1) = E[Uctct ] ·Cov(c˜t , ˜W 1), (62)
Cov(VG, ˜W 1) = E[VGG] ·Cov( ˜G, ˜W 1) (63)
and in equation (45) as
Cov(Uct , x˜) = E[Uctct ] ·Cov(c˜t , x˜), (64)
Cov(VG, x˜) = E[VGG] ·Cov( ˜G, x˜). (65)
Inserting the private budget constraint (6) for c˜t respectively the public one (25)
for ˜Gt and applying some covariance rules, these covariances turn into
Cov(Uct , ˜W 1) = E[Uctct ]
{
(1− tL2 )g(e∗)Cov( ˜W 1, ˜W 1)+ (1− tK1 )AR Cov(x˜, ˜W 1)
}
,(66)
Cov(VG, ˜W 1) = E[VGG]
{
tL2 g(e
∗)Cov( ˜W 1, ˜W 1)+ tK1 AR Cov(x˜, ˜W 1)
}
, (67)
Cov(Uct , x˜) = E[Uctct ]
{
(1− tL2 )g(e∗)Cov( ˜W 1, x˜)+ (1− tK1 )AR Cov(x˜, x˜)
}
, (68)
Cov(VG, x˜) = E[VGG]
{
tL2 g(e
∗)Cov( ˜W 1, x˜)+ tK1 AR Cov(x˜, x˜)
}
. (69)
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From Proposition 3 and equation (45), we can equate the RHS of equations
(68) and (69) and solve for tK1 as
tK1 =
E[Uctct ]AR Cov(x˜, x˜)+
{
E[Uctct ] (1− tL2 )−E[VGG] tL2
}
g(e∗)Cov( ˜W 1, x˜)
(E[Uctct ]+E[VG]) AR Cov(x˜, x˜)
.
(70)
Equating the RHS of equations (66) and (67), substituting (70) for tK1 and col-
lecting terms leads to
tL2
1− tL2
=
E[Uctct ] ·
{
g(e∗)Cov( ˜W 1, ˜W 1)− (E[Uctct ]+E[VGG])g(e
∗) Cov( ˜W 1,x˜)2
(E[Uct ct ]+E[VGG])Cov(x˜,x˜)
}
E[VGG] ·
{
g(e∗)Cov( ˜W 1, ˜W 1)− (E[Uctct ]+E[VGG])g(e
∗) Cov( ˜W 1,x˜)2
(E[Uctct ]+E[VGG])Cov(x˜,x˜)
}
=
E[Uctct ]
E[VGG]
=
−
E[Uct ct ]
E[Uct ]
−
E[VGG]
E[VG]
=
GARA(ct)
GARA(G) , (71)
where, in the second line, we have used E[Uct ] = E[VG] from Proposition 2 and
the definition of global absolute risk aversion GARA(a), a = ct ,G. This proves
the first part of equation (49).
Analogously, we can apply Proposition 2 and equation (43) in order to solve
the RHS of equations (66) and (67) for
tL2 =
E[Uctct ]g(e∗)Cov( ˜W 1, ˜W 1)+
{
E[Uctct ] (1− tK1 )−E[VGG] tK1
}
AR Cov( ˜W 1, x˜)
(E[Uctct ]+E[VG]) g(e∗)Cov( ˜W 1, ˜W 1)
.
(72)
Equating the RHS of equations (68) and (69) and substituting (72) for tL2 , now, we
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have from the same procedure as above
tK1
1− tK1
=
E[Uctct ] ·
{
AR Cov(x˜, x˜)− (E[Uctct ]+E[VGG])A
R Cov( ˜W 1,x˜)2
(E[Uctct ]+E[VGG])Cov( ˜W 1, ˜W 1)
}
E[VGG] ·
{
AR Cov(x˜, x˜)− (E[Uctct ]+E[VGG])A
R Cov( ˜W 1,x˜)2
(E[Uctct ]+E[VGG])Cov( ˜W 1, ˜W 1)
}
=
E[Uctct ]
E[VGG]
=
−
E[Uctct ]
E[Uct ]
−
E[VGG]
E[VG]
=
GARA(ct)
GARA(G)
, (73)
which proves the second part of equation (49).
Relying on equation (49) now, it is straightforward to prove Proposition 5,
because its parts (ii) and (iii) follow from simple differentiation, taking GARA(ct)
and GARA(G) as parameters.
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